Investment - Cash Flow Sensitivity and Financing Constraints: New Evidence from Indian Business Group Firms \ud by Pallathitta, Rejie et al.
Investment - Cash Flow Sensitivity and Financing Constraints: 
New Evidence from Indian Business Group Firms 
 
 
 
Rejie George 
(Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, India) 
 
Rezaul Kabir 
(University of Twente, The Netherlands 
 
Jing Qian 
(Unibail-Rodamco, The Netherlands) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
A controversy exists on the use of the investment – cash flow sensitivity as a measure 
of financing constraints of firms. We re-examine this controversy by analyzing firms 
affiliated to Indian business groups. We find a strong investment – cash flow 
sensitivity for both group-affiliated and independent firms, but no significant 
difference in the sensitivity between them. Additional tests consistently demonstrate 
that investment – cash flow sensitivity of Indian group affiliated firms is not 
significantly lower relative to unaffiliated firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A large body of literature investigates how the investment – cash flow 
sensitivity changes with the financing constraints of firms (see Hubbard, 1998; 
Lensink, Bo and Sterken, 2001) for excellent surveys of the literature). Analyzing a 
sample of U.S. firms, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988, 2000) document that 
investments undertaken by more financially constrained firms are more sensitive to 
the availability of internal funds. International studies also provide evidence of a 
firm’s investments being highly related to its cash flows. Most of these studies focus 
primarily on developed industrialized economies like Canada, France, Germany, 
Japan, Netherlands, and the U.K. (see for example, Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick, 
1998; Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; Degryse and de Jong, 2006; Aggarwal and 
Zong, 2006; Cleary, Povel and Raith, 2007). A few studies also analyze data from 
some emerging economies like China, Chile, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, etc. 
(Laeven, 2003; Bhaduri, 2005; Shen and Wang, 2005; Ghosh; 2006). 
A controversy arises when Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Cleary 
(1999) show that least financially constrained U.S. firms also exhibit greater 
investment – cash flow sensitivity. This opposite finding came as a blow to those who 
were firm believers of the traditional view. Later studies indicate that the source of 
this mixed result lies, among others, in the disagreement among researchers in 
identifying appropriate factors to segregate more financially constrained firms from 
less constrained ones (Moyen, 2004; Cleary et al., 2007). The criteria used to classify 
firms into more and less constrained categories - dividend payout ratio, debt 
financing, financial distress, debt rating, firm size and firm age – are not without 
drawbacks. For example, the criteria are endogenous in the sense that these are not 
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independently determined. The financial constraint feature itself may already 
influence these firm-specific variables. Moreover, these classifying factors are time-
variant: a company identified as financially constrained now may not remain 
constrained in the future. 
The potential to resolve the controversy lies in the analysis of cross-country / 
international data whereby researcher can use exogenous criteria. For example, 
multinational data can be used to categorize firms into bank-based and capital market-
based financial systems. These two types of financial systems are expected to 
generate a differential impact on the cost/availability of internal and external 
financing, and thus easing of financial constraints (Bond et al., 2003; Aggarwal and 
Zong, 2006). Another exogenous characteristic to explore is network-based 
organizations present in many countries. The most popular and well-documented form 
of networks related to the multinational arena is that of business groups. Business 
groups are a set of independent firms connected together by means of formal and 
informal relationships. These exist in most emerging markets as well as in many 
developed economies (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). Firms belonging to business 
groups can use internal capital market benefits and receive better access to financial 
resources relative to stand-alone firms (Deloof, 1998; Lensink et al., 2003). This 
feature makes it quite appealing to examine business group firms and compare their 
investment – cash flow sensitivity with those of non-group firms. 
Empirical tests are performed by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and 
Kato, Loewenstein and Tsay (2002) who examine Japanese business groups, and Shin 
and Park (1999) who examine Korean business groups. Interestingly, these studies 
find a mixed result: Japanese business group firms exhibit a lower investment – cash 
flow sensitivity while there is no relationship between cash flow and investment 
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among group-affiliated firms in Korea. This conflicting finding is due to unique 
characteristics of business groups of Japan and Korea (see for example Ferris, Kumar 
and Sarin (1995) and Shin and Park (2005) for a description of salient features of 
Japanese and Korean business groups). Another reason could be the lack of plenty 
robustness checks with alternative empirical specifications. 
The purpose of the paper is to extend prior international studies examining the 
investment – cash flow relationship among group firms by focusing on one of the 
largest emerging markets - India. An analysis of Indian business groups can be useful 
because of several distinct features. First, it is possible to identify business group 
affiliation in India with a high level of accuracy. This information is publicly 
disclosed in annual reports and/or filings with regulatory authorities.1 Moreover, firms 
are usually members of only one business group as there are very few mergers 
between firms across different groups. Second, Indian business groups are not 
centered on a financial intermediary and therefore do not have close banking ties, as is 
the case for business groups in Japan. A strong influence of a bank usually can result 
in firms holding less free cash flows for future investment purposes. Third, the group-
affiliated firms of India we analyze are free of any selection bias. There are basically 
hundreds of business groups in India. Several are extremely big with dozens of 
affiliated companies. On the other hand, a vast majority are small groups with a 
handful number of affiliated firms. Moreover, many business groups are diversified 
into a considerable number of industries. This diversity of business groups can have 
additional consequences for investments and financing. All these varieties of business 
groups are included in our study. We do not impose any restriction like Big-6 
                                               
1 Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) discuss the problems one faces in accurately determining 
group membership of Japanese firms. 
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Keiretsus in Japan and Top-30 Chaebols in Korea.2 These characteristics of Indian 
business groups together with the use of a relatively large sample of both group and 
non-group firms and a variety of robust empirical estimation techniques enable us to 
undertake a careful examination of the investment – cash flow relationship. 
We also perform additional investigations by examining numerous firm 
characteristics commonly used in prior studies as proxy for financing constraints. 
Several studies (e.g. Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and 
Maksimovic, 2006; Cleary, 2006) use firm factors like size, age and leverage in 
categorizing firms’ degree of financial constraints. However, the impact of these 
characteristics on the investment – cash flow sensitivity of group-affiliated firms 
remains largely unexplored. 
A final contribution of the study comes from the fact that an in-depth 
investigation of the role of ownership structure of firms has not yet been undertaken. 
Since the presence of large shareholdings can affect a firm’s investment decisions as 
well as its financing constraints, we investigate whether or not corporate, institutional 
and insider ownerships lead to a difference in the investment – cash flow sensitivity of 
Indian group affiliated firms. 
The results of this study show a strong investment – cash flow sensitivity for 
both group-affiliated and independent firms in India. However, there is no significant 
difference in the sensitivity between these two categories of firms. Our results are on 
the one hand in line with the evidence reported by Hoshi et al. (1991) and Shin and 
park (1991) who find that non group firms in Japan and Korea exhibit positive 
sensitivity of investments to cash flows. On the other hand, these are also in contrast 
                                               
2 The sample analyzed by Khanna and Palepu (2004) consists of 567 firms affiliated to 252 different 
business groups. There exists no separate classification to identify a few dominant business groups in 
India. 
  
5
 
to Hoshi et al. (1991) and Kato et al. (2002) who find significantly lower sensitivity 
associated with Japanese group affiliated firms.  
Analyzing the interactions of group affiliation with major firm-characteristics, 
we observe that the investment – cash flow sensitivity for large group-affiliated firms 
is significantly higher than that for large non-group firms. On the other hand, there is 
no difference in investment – cash flow sensitivity between highly levered group 
firms and highly levered stand-alone firms. We also observe that larger ownerships by 
corporations, institutions or insiders do not reduce the investment – cash flow 
sensitivity of group-affiliated firms. These and many other additional empirical 
analyses consistently show that investments of a priori classified more financially 
constrained firms are not more sensitive to their cash flows. Our study therefore lends 
support to the claim made by several authors that the investment – cash flow 
relationship is not really a reliable measure to gauge a firm’s financing constraints. 
The rest of the article is organized in the following manner. The literature on 
business groups and the investment – cash flow relationship is briefly discussed in 
Section 2. In Section 3 we present the methodology used in examining the 
relationship. A description of the data used in this study is presented in Section 4. The 
empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 5. Some concluding remarks 
are made in Section 6. 
 
2. Business groups and the investment – cash flow relationship 
2.1 Business groups 
A business group is a popular form of informal organizational present in many 
countries of the world. An important characteristic of business groups is that bindings, 
especially through ownership, control, financial and commercial transactions, and 
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social relationships, link several independent firms into an informal network. In Asia, 
Japanese groups called keiretsu and Korean groups called chaebol are long-standing 
examples. But, business groups are also common in South America and Europe. They 
play a prominent role in many economies. Guillén (2000) reports that countries with 
substantial levels of business group activity measured by the stock market 
capitalization of the top ten business groups as a proportion of the country’s GDP 
include Taiwan (more than 100%), South Korea (40%), India (38%), Mexico (36%), 
Spain (35%) and Indonesia (34%). Most empirical work on business groups focus on 
developing countries and especially on the relative performance of affiliated firms. 
See for example, Chang and Hong (2000) on Korea, and Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
on India. 
Groups encompass both stock exchange listed as well as unlisted firms. 
Khanna and Palepu (2004) report that 95% of business groups in India have five or 
fewer affiliates. In effect, the average business group in India has around two listed 
firms. Each group-affiliated firm has its own set of shareholdings comprising of 
various blockholders and the general public. The largest business groups are active in 
a wide variety of enterprises and cover vast tracts of the industrial sector. Control over 
group firms is typically exercised through inter-corporate equity investments (cross 
equity shareholdings), holding companies (pyramidal structures) and interlocking 
directorates. The complex network of firms is evident from the partial structure of the 
largest business group in India, the Tata group which is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
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The Figure shows that Tata Sons represents the main ‘promoter’ company of 
the group and is the group headquarter. In addition to Tata Sons, two other group 
companies, Tata Industries and the Investment Corporation of India represent two 
centers around which control is exercised over a number of other Tata group firms. 
Two-thirds of the equity of Tata Sons is held by various philanthropic trusts endowed 
by members of the Tata Family. Unfortunately, precise details on the equity linkages 
among the various Tata group firms are not available to fully ascertain the nature of 
the cross- and pyramidal-holdings. The Economist of Jan 13, 2007 reported that 
before 1991, the stakes held by the family in many of the 300-odd companies in Tata 
group were tiny. The newly appointed chairman of the Tata group sold stakes in some 
companies and used cash to shore up control. There are now only 96 listed and 
unlisted companies in the group and Tata Sons own at least 26% of each of them. 
Firms affiliated to business groups can, on the one hand, derive a variety of 
benefits but, on the other hand, also incur diverse costs (Ghemawat and Khanna, 
1998; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Chang and Hong, 2000; Buysschaert et al., 2008). 
For example, business groups enable the formation of an internal capital market that 
allows affiliated firms to benefit from efficient institutional mechanisms and lowering 
of transaction costs. Chang and Hong (2000) show that group firms share different 
types of intangible and technological resources and generate enormous scale-and-
scope economies. The costs associated with group affiliation can come from different 
sources. The controlling owners of a business group may engage in activities to 
redirect funds into their own benefits and/or into investments of another firm within 
the same business group. Bertrand, Mehta, Mullianathan (2002) document tunneling 
among Indian firms in which resources are shifted from firms in a group which have 
low cash flow rights to firms which have high cash flow rights. Gopalan, Nanda and 
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Seru (2007) show that intra-group loans are important means of transferring cash 
among group firms and supporting financially weaker firms. George and Kabir (2008) 
observe profit redistribution among Indian group-affiliated firms – a phenomenon 
through which resources are transferred from one affiliated firm to another affiliated 
firm. 
 
2.2 Investment – cash flow relationship of group-affiliated firms 
 
Several studies analyze the investment – cash flow relationship for business 
groups from different countries, but obtain dissimilar findings. Hoshi et al. (1991) 
find that Japanese companies that are affiliated with Keiretsu and have a close link 
with a main bank exhibit lower investment – cash flow sensitivity. Kato et al. (2002) 
also observe significantly lower investment – cash flow relationship for Japanese 
group-affiliated firms. However, Shin and Park (1999) find no relationship between 
cash flow and investment for Korean Chaebol firms. These studies document a 
significant positive relationship for non-group companies, and therefore, infer that 
unaffiliated firms face higher financial constraints in their investment decisions. 
There is a lack of comprehensive analysis of investment – cash flow 
sensitivity among Indian firms. While examining the relative profitability of Indian 
business groups, Khanna and Palepu (2000) mention observing a strong investment – 
cash flow sensitivity for group and non-group firms. But, they do not provide any 
numerical result in the paper. In a cross-country analysis of 13 developing countries, 
Laeven (2003) includes a small number of Indian firms, but does not make any 
country-specific analysis. Lensink, Van der Molen and Gangopadhyay (2003) 
examine a sample of Indian firms from the period 1989-97 and observe that group-
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firms have lower cash flows sensitivity than non-group firms. But, their study suffers 
from limitations like the use of a crude measure of cash flows (sum of net profit and 
depreciation) and a lack of robustness analysis with stock market data. Bhaduri (2005) 
and Ghosh (2006) investigate if financial liberalization program introduced in India 
since the beginning of the 1990s has affected the financing constraints of firms. Both 
studies use the coefficient of cash flow variable as the metric of financing constraint 
and document conflicting results. Bhaduri (2005) finds an increase in financing 
constraint for small and young firms, while Ghosh (2006) repots that financial 
liberalization significantly reduces financing constraints for small firms. Moreover, 
Ghosh (2006) does not make any analysis of group/non-group firms. 
Deloof (1998) and Perotti and Gelfer (2001) analyze the presence of business 
groups in two developed countries: Belgium and Russia, respectively. Although 
Deloof (1998) uses a sample of large private firms in Belgium and faces problems in 
clearly distinguishing independent firms, he finds that investments of group-affiliated 
firms are not related to their cash flows. On the other hand, Perotti and Gelfer (2001) 
analyze single year data from a small sample of Russian firms and observe cash flows 
to be a significant determinant of investment for both industrial group firms and 
independent firms. Overall, these studies on business groups do not provide a clear-
cut picture on the relationship between investment – cash flow sensitivity and 
financing constraints. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The most popular approaches to test the investment – cash flow relationship 
involve examining two types of investment models: the Q model and the Euler 
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equation model. Since each of these models has its own strengths and weaknesses and 
is widely employed in previous studies (e.g. Perotti and Gelfer, 2001; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2001; Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; Shen and Wang, 2006; Aggarwal 
and Zong, 2006), we use both models to estimate the empirical results and to ensure 
that our results are not due to estimation bias. According to the Q model, a firm’s 
investments are mainly determined by expectations of future profit opportunities, 
usually estimated by the ratio of the market value of assets to its replacement value. 
The model adjusted to include the availability of internal funds as an additional 
determinant of investment can be written as follows (Ağca and Mozumdar, 2008): 
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where I denotes the investment in fixed assets; K denotes the capital stock at 
the beginning of the period; Q is the ratio of the market value of capital to its 
replacement value; CF stands for the cash flows; i  and t  denote the firm and time 
period, respectively; and e  is the error term.3  
There are studies that divide the sample of firms based on a firm characteristic 
and then examine if the cash flow coefficient is different across the groups of firms. 
An equivalent and more direct approach is to estimate the model for the entire sample 
and employ the interaction of the cash flow variable with a dummy variable 
representing the same firm characteristic. This direct approach is used throughout the 
                                               
3 For the derivation of the Q model, see Hubbard (1998). 
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study.4 The regression specification we use to analyze the specific effect of business 
group characteristic is the following: 
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In this equation, b1 is expected to be positive, because an increase in firm’s 
future profitability should lead to an increase in firm’s investment. If higher cash 
flows are a significant determinant of higher investments, then the coefficient b2 
should be positive. With Group as a dummy variable equal to 1 for group-affiliated 
firms, the traditional view is that the investment – cash flow sensitivity is expected to 
be smaller for less financially constrained firms. Therefore, the regression coefficient 
b3 capturing the influence of group affiliation on the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow should be negative. In equation (2), we also add a few control variables like firm 
size and firm age. These are denoted by Xit. Investment and financing behaviors of 
firms are also influenced by macro-economic factors including the business cycle. 
Moreover, these macro factors may affect firms of different industries differently. In 
order to check whether the regressions are robust with regard to changes in macro-
economic factors, we add both time and industry dummies in the regressions. 
The Q model has the advantage that it uses information from the capital 
market thus allowing direct measurement of expected value of future profitability. 
The results of the Q model are also more informative. On the other hand, stock market 
prices can be inefficient, the replacement value of all assets can be difficult to 
                                               
4 We did examine the specifications using group and non-group samples separately and found similar 
results. 
  
12
 
measure, and the commonly used average Q can be an imprecise proxy for the value 
of an additional unit of new capital (marginal Q). After evaluating several proxies to 
compute Q, Erickson and Whited (2006) conclude that researchers are just as well off 
using a simple measure of Q as using a computationally complex measure. Yet, as a 
robustness check, we employ the main alternative to the Q model, i.e. the Euler 
equation investment model. The model exploits the relationship between investments 
in successive time periods and has the advantage that it does not require explicit use 
of future values. According to the Euler equation model, a firm’s current investments 
are determined by its total sales, cash flows, past investments and total debt. The 
model yields the following empirical specification (Laeven, 2003):5 
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where S and D represent total sales and total debt, respectively, and all other 
variables are as defined earlier. The explicit regression specification we estimate to 
test the differential effect of business group firms is the following: 
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5 For the derivation of the Euler equation, see Bond and Meghir (1994). 
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In this equation, the coefficient b2 reflects the investment – cash flow 
relationship and is expected to be positive. According to the traditional view, the less 
financially constrained group-affiliated firms are expected to show a lower investment 
– cash flow sensitivity relative to independent firms. In that case, the regression 
coefficient b3 should be negative. 
The models are first estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
Since we wanted to ensure that our results are free from any estimation bias, we also 
use the generalized instrumental variables estimation procedure. Similar to prior 
studies, we use lagged values of current period regressors as instruments. This 
approach is also known as the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. As Verbeek 
(2004) explains, the 2SLS estimation is a special case of the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) approach.6 
 
4. Data 
 
The data come from the database called ‘Capitaline 2000’ which contains 
balance sheet, income statement and ownership information for a large number of 
Indian firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. The sample period covers the 
fiscal years ending 1997-2000. We select those firms for which complete data are 
available for all years. Similar to Cleary (1999), we eliminate firms undergoing 
restructuring and/or bankruptcy by including firms with positive values of total assets 
and total sales. Our sample consists of a balanced panel of 339 firms. The sample 
                                               
6 The number of moment conditions we use is equal to the number of unknown parameters. Ideally, it 
would be better to use the GMM estimation with a larger set of instruments and employ the Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions to determine the appropriateness of these instruments. Unfortunately, 
data limitations prevent us from doing that. 
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firms are distributed across several industries, the most important of which are 
chemicals, construction, metal, transport, and trade and services. 
The database clearly identifies firms affiliated to a business group. The 
identification of business groups in India is relatively straightforward because firms 
publicly disclose this information in annual reports and/or regulatory filings. 
Moreover, firms usually remain members of only one business group. There is no 
evidence of any change in group-membership over time. Whether a firm is affiliated 
to a business group or not is determined using a variety of sources like public 
announcements made by individual corporations and groups, and regulatory filings.7 
Our sample comprises of 141 (42%) non-group firms and 198 (58%) group firms (a 
total of 1356 firm-year observations). 
We collect data on a wide variety of firm-specific variables. The precise 
definition of each of these variables is presented in the appendix. In order to eliminate 
the influence of extreme observations, we winsorize the data following the procedure 
adopted by Cleary (1999). The following rules are applied: (i) assign a value of 5 (-5) 
if cash flow/capital ratio is greater (lower) than 5 (-5); (ii) assign a value of 2 if 
investment/capital ratio is greater than 2; (iii) assign a value of 10 if Q is greater than 
10; (iv) assign a value of 5 if debt/capital ratio is greater than 5; (v) assign a value of 
15 if sales/capital ratio is greater than 15.  
We also collect data on the ownership structure of firms. Three different 
ownership variables are analyzed: the percentage of shares held by insiders (directors 
and family members), financial institutions and non-financial corporations. The 
ownership data are available for one year and are assumed to remain the same for the 
                                               
7 A random check of group-affiliation of many firms conducted by us reveals that the classification of 
the database is accurate. 
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sample period. In the light of sporadic large-scale ownership transfers in India, any 
potential error in our results will be negligible. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
The descriptive statistics of different variables are presented in Table 1. Since 
we want to contrast the investment – cash flow relationship of group and non-group 
firms, we divide the full sample according to group affiliation. Panel A of the table 
presents mean, median and standard deviations of each variable for both categories of 
firms. In Panels B and C, we also show the mean values of group and non-group firms 
based on size and industry categorizations. Several interesting results emerge. 
Looking first at the Panel A, we find that for investment (I/K) and cash flow 
(CF/K) variables, there are almost no remarkable differences between group and non-
group firms. The mean investment-to-capital ratio is about 18% for both group and 
non-group firms, whereas the median values are 11.4% and 9.5%, respectively. The 
mean and median cash flow-to-capital ratios of group-affiliated firms are 36.8% and 
27.3%, respectively. They are insignificantly different from those of stand-alone 
firms, which are 40.9% and 29.5%, respectively. We find that the mean and median Q 
ratios of group firms are larger than those of stand-alone firms. The mean (median) Q 
ratios of group and non-group firms are 1.06 (0.78) and 0.82 (0.73), respectively. 
With regard to the other variables, significant differences do exist between group and 
non-group firms. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
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Focusing on the size of firms, we observe that group firms are much larger 
than non-group firms. The mean (median) total assets (TA) of group firms is 752 
(173) millions Rupees compared to 134 (43) millions of non-group firms. The larger 
size of group firms is also observed when we look at the total sales (TS) figures. The 
differences in mean and median sales of group and non-group firms are statistically 
significant. The mean leverage (D/K) of group-affiliated firms is significantly lower 
than that of independent firms, whereas the median values are not different. Group-
affiliated firms are, on average, older than independent firms. The mean age of group-
firms is 31 years compared to 22 years of non-group firms. 
Finally, we find that there are statistically significant differences in the 
ownership structure between group and non-group firms. The mean percentage of 
shares held by other companies in group-affiliated firms is 38% which is larger than 
that of stand-alone firms (24%). It is an indication of the fact that the stakes held by 
domestic corporations affiliated with the same group can actually be considered as 
equivalent to insider holdings. These corporate owners play a significant role in the 
investment and financing decision-making of group affiliated firms. The Table also 
shows that the mean percentage of shares held by financial institutions in affiliated 
firms is 12% which is larger than that of independent firms (6%). Most of the 
financial institutions are government owned or are institutions in which government 
possesses a substantial degree of influence. The average insider (consisting of 
directors and family members) ownership stake is higher in non-group firms (24% for 
stand-alone companies versus 7% for group affiliates). 
Data presented in Panel A show that group affiliated firms are significantly 
larger than independent firms. In order to see the difference in firm size within the 
category of both group and non-group firms, we further classify each category of 
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firms into large and small sub-categories. The size sub-samples are formed by using 
the median total assets of each category of firms. Large firms are those with total 
assets greater than or equal to sample median whereas small firms are those with total 
assets lower than sample median. The results presented in Panel B of Table 1 show 
that for the majority of variables, the mean values of large firms are significantly 
different from those of smaller firms.  
We also present in Panel C summary information for group and non-group 
companies on the basis of firm’s industry affiliation. In all eight industry groupings, 
we do not observe any notable difference in the investment-to-capital ratio of group 
and non-group firms. In each industry, affiliated firms are significantly larger in size. 
We also find that group firms are older in the majority of industries.  
 
5.2 Regression analysis 
 
The investment – cash flow relationship of group and non-group firms is 
estimated using several alternative model specifications. Table 2 displays the 
regression results estimated from several specifications of the Q model in equation 
(2). Panel A reports the results of all model specifications using the ordinary least 
squares estimation method (OLS), while Panel B shows the results of same 
specifications using the two-stage least squares method (2SLS). All models use log of 
size and log of age as control variables. We also present results with and without time 
and industry dummies. These dummies are included to control for time-varying 
factors like macro-economic variables. In order to test whether the phenomenon of 
group affiliation affects investments – cash flow relationship, we analyze the 
interaction of the cash flow variable with a group affiliation dummy variable. 
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(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Panel A results indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between investment and Q. All model specifications show almost the 
same magnitude of the estimated coefficient. The explanatory power of regressions is 
not low (varying from 13% to 17%) and consistent with prior studies. Turning to the 
cash flow variable, we observe that the estimated coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant in each model specification. It indicates that cash flows are 
strongly related to investments for all firms. We also observe that the estimated cash 
flow coefficient is not significantly different between group-affiliated and 
independent firms. The interaction coefficients of cash flow and group dummy 
variable in models (2) and (4) are statistically insignificant. 
Besides the OLS technique, we estimate the same specifications using the 
2SLS technique. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2. As before, the 
coefficients of Q and cash flow are found to be positive and statistically significant. 
We observe that the coefficients of the cash flow term interacting with business group 
dummy in models (6) and (8) are positive and statistically significant. This is opposite 
of what many expect for less financially constrained firms. Hoshi et al. (1991) find 
that the investment – cash flow sensitivity is less for Japanese group firms. On the 
other hand, we should note here that our result of less constrained group-affiliated 
firms not exhibiting a lower investment – cash flow sensitivity is not a characteristic 
of Indian business groups alone. Analyzing U.S. firms, Allayannis and Mozumdar 
(2004) also do not observe any significant difference in the investment - cash flow 
sensitivity between constrained and unconstrained firms. 
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The regressions analysis presented earlier is based on the full sample 
consisting of all firm-year observations. The time-period of our analysis is on the one 
hand characterized by large economic growth, on the other hand by a major external 
shock (East Asian Crisis in 1997, although India was not affected by it substantially). 
In order to check the robustness of full-sample results, we perform a separate analysis 
using year-by-year regressions. The results presented in Table 3 further support our 
earlier findings. The cash flow coefficients are mostly positive and statistically 
significant. On the other hand, all but one of the interaction coefficients of cash flow 
and group dummy variable are statistically insignificant. The result indicates that the 
investment – cash flow sensitivity of group and non-group firms are not dissimilar. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
We also assess the robustness of our results by estimating the Euler model of 
investment (specification 4). The results are presented in Table 4. Once again, the 
cash-flow coefficient is positive and statistically significant, but the business group 
interaction term is either significantly higher or statistically insignificant. This is 
inconsistent with the claim that firms belonging to business groups should depict a 
lower investment – cash flow relationship because these firms experience lower 
financing constraints relative to independent firms.  
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
The regression results presented in Tables 2 and 4 consider firm-level 
observations of all sample years taken together. A robustness check is therefore 
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undertaken by performing average (across all years) regressions. Table 5 shows these 
results whereby both types of investment models (Q and Euler equations) are 
employed. The findings are entirely consistent with those obtained earlier. 
 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
We conduct further sensitivity checks of our results. One can argue that the 
observed strong investment – cash flow sensitivity of group-affiliated firms can be 
attributed to overinvestments made by group firms with poor growth prospects (Hoshi 
et al., 1991). To examine this, we follow prior studies in using Q as a proxy for a 
firm’s growth prospects and split the group-affiliated sample into high Q and low Q 
firms based on the median value.8 For overinvestment to be a reason behind higher 
sensitivity of group-affiliated firms, cash flows of group-firms with meager growth 
prospects (low Q) should be more sensitive to their investments than the cash flows of 
group-firms with huge growth prospects (high Q). The results of the analysis are 
presented in Table 6.9  
 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
The OLS results indicate that the investment – cash flow sensitivity of group-
affiliated firms with poor growth prospects are statistically indistinguishable from that 
of firms with high growth prospects. The 2SLS results indicate even significantly 
higher cash flow sensitivity for group-affiliated high Q firms. This is contrary to the 
expectation if overinvestments were driving our results. 
                                               
8 The results are qualitatively similar when we use Q >1 as the partitioning criteria. 
9 For comparison purpose, we present the results of non-group firms as well. 
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The use of different specifications and methodologies yields very similar 
results.10 We find no support for the claim that the investment – cash flow sensitivity 
for group-affiliated firms is lower than for unaffiliated firms. Since group firms are 
widely believed to have relatively easier access to more financial resources than non-
group firms, our results indicate that the investment – cash flow sensitivity is not a 
reliable measure of firm’s financing constraints. 
We perform additional analysis by disaggregating the sample into sub-samples 
according to various firm-specific characteristics. The first classification is made on 
the basis of firm size.11 The results presented in Table 7 show that in the large firm 
sub-sample, the coefficient of cash flow and group dummy interaction is significantly 
positive. The finding is contrary to the expectation because both large and group-
affiliated firms are deemed a priori to have less financing constraints, and therefore, 
should exhibit the least investment – cash flow sensitivity. We also analyze the case 
whereby the sample is divided into group-affiliated firms and stand-alone firms, and 
the coefficient of the cash flow term is interacted with size dummy, which is equal to 
one if the value of total assets of a group (non-group) firm is higher than the median, 
and zero otherwise. The results presented in the last two columns of Table 7 show that 
the investment – cash flow sensitivity for large group-affiliated firms is positive and 
statistically significant. The finding is once again a contradiction. 
 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
                                               
10  Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) argue that the inclusion of negative cash flow observations (which 
are essentially firms in financial distress) in a sample could significantly influence investment – cash 
flow sensitivities. We therefore re-estimate the results after eliminating all negative cash flow 
observations (which constitute 6.7% of the sample). These results show similar sensitivities among 
group-affiliated and independent firms and hence not reported. 
11 We classify group and non-group firms as large when their total assets are greater their 
corresponding median values. 
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Next, we test whether the differences in the age of firms affect the investment 
– cash flow sensitivity. The empirical results are presented in Table 8. In each 
regression, we examine the interaction of cash flow variable with a dummy that 
identifies older or younger firms. The results show that the cash flow variable has a 
positive and significant relationship with investments for both group-affiliated and 
unaffiliated firms. But, the interaction coefficients are statistically insignificant. It 
indicates that neither young nor old firms exhibit a different sensitivity of investments 
to cash flows. 
 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
Companies with relatively high leverage are expected to face more difficulty 
in obtaining additional external funds from the capital market, and therefore, are more 
financially constrained than those with low leverage. One expects, at least in case of 
independent firms, a higher investment – cash flow sensitivity. The results presented 
in Table 8 show that for group-affiliated firms, the investment – cash flow sensitivity 
is not different for high leveraged firms in comparison to low leveraged firms. 
Similarly, the leverage interaction variable is statistically insignificant for independent 
firms.12 
Our final analysis is with respect to firm’s ownership structure. Active 
monitoring by large shareholders can reduce managerial discretion and information 
asymmetry. At the same time, large shareholders help in reducing firm’s financing 
constraints. The results examining the influence of large shareholders are presented in 
Table 9. We observe that corporate ownership does not affect the investment – cash 
                                               
12 As before, we have performed Q and Euler equation estimations using the 2SLS technique. These 
estimations yielded similar results and, therefore, not reported here. 
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flow sensitivity among group-affiliated firms. On the other hand, it has a significant 
positive impact among independent firms. Thus, for unaffiliated firms with high 
corporate ownership, the cash flow sensitivity is significantly larger than for those 
with low corporate ownership. With regard to both institutional and insider 
ownership, we find that these do not significantly influence the investment – cash 
flow sensitivity of group-affiliated as well as unaffiliated firms. These results are 
again not in line with the expectation of a lower investment – cash flow sensitivity for 
firms with higher levels of insider shareholdings. 
 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We examine the reliability of using the investment – cash flow sensitivity as a 
measure of financing constraints by comparing Indian business group firms with 
independent firms. Prior research argues that since business group membership helps 
firms in relieving their financial constraints, these firms should exhibit lower 
investment – cash flow sensitivity. On the other hand, firms without group affiliation 
are relatively more financially constrained and thus expected to have larger cash flow 
sensitivity. We therefore conduct an empirical analysis using a large number of 
group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms from India. 
The empirical results show that there is a positive and statistically significant 
investment – cash flow sensitivity for all firms, but no significant difference in the 
sensitivity between Indian group-affiliated and independent firms. We perform 
various robustness checks using alternative estimation specifications and 
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methodologies and also examine the impact of several firm-specific characteristics 
such as size, age, leverage and ownership. The battery of tests undertaken by us 
consistently show that investments of more financially constrained firms are not more 
sensitive to their cash flows. Our results analyzing Indian business group firms thus 
provide support for those studies that question the investment – cash flow sensitivity 
as a reliable measure of a firm’s financing constraint. An important implication of our 
study is that researchers may not automatically relate a firm’s investment – cash flow 
sensitivity with its financing constraint status. However, given that the results of our 
study simply stem from the context of one particular country, new analysis of firms 
from different countries can shed further light on this issue. Nevertheless, to the 
extent that we observe positive and significant investment – cash flow sensitivity for 
both group and non-group firms, one can still argue that the finding remains 
consistent with the interpretation that all firms in India have financial constraints. 
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Appendix: Definition of variables 
 
 
 
 
I    Investment in fixed assets (= purchase of fixed assets) 
 
K    Book value of fixed assets  
 
CF Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization 
 
Q  (Market value of equity + Book value of total debt) / 
Book value of total assets  
 
TA    Book value of total assets 
 
TS    Total sales 
 
D    Book value of total debt 
 
AGE    Number of years since incorporation 
 
COR    Percentage of shares held by non-financial corporations 
 
FIN    Percentage of shares held by financial institutions 
 
INS    Percentage of shares held by directors and family 
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Figure 1. The Tata Group (partial structure) 13 
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Table 1. Summary statistics  
The table presents summary statistics of 198 group-affiliated firms (792 firm-year observations) and 
141 non-group firms (564 firm-year observations). Investment (I), capital stock (K), cash flow (CF), 
total assets (TA), total sales (TS), total debt (D) are expressed in million Indian Rupees. Q is the ratio 
of market to book value of total assets. AGE is expressed in years since incorporation. Insider (INS) is 
the percentage of shares held by directors and family. Financial (FIN) is the percentage of shares held 
by domestic financial institutions. Corporation (COR) is the percentage of shares held by domestic 
non-financial corporations. All variables are defined in the appendix. Statistical significance of the 
difference between group and non-group firms at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated in bold face and 
by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Group and non-group firms. 
 
 
Group Non-Group  
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
I/K 0.184 0.114** 0.221 0.179 0.095 0.247 
CF/K 0.368 0.273 0.461 0.409 0.295 0.595 
Q 1.057** 0.780** 1.042 0.819 0.734 0.539 
TA 752** 173** 2100 134 43 612 
TS 574** 192** 1283 158 57 628 
TS/K 2.761** 2.000** 2.567 3.471 2.291 3.344 
D/K 0.978* 0.840 0.679 1.054 0.821 0.885 
AGE 31* 24 21.343 22 16 16.228 
COR 0.378** 0.387** 0.186 0.240 0.195 0.194 
FIN 0.117** 0.086** 0.107 0.061 0.023 0.086 
INS 0.068** 0.014** 0.125 0.236 0.224 0.178 
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Panel B: Mean values of group and non-group firms based on size categorization. 
 
 
 
 
Group Non-Group 
 Large Small Large Small 
I/K 0.191 0.178 0.209** 0.148 
CF/K 0.308** 0.427 0.488** 0.329 
Q 1.091 1.028 0.914** 0.723 
TA 1425** 80 249** 23 
TS/K 2.279** 3.252 3.561 3.380 
D/K 0.992 0.966 1.195** 0.913 
AGE 37** 25 30** 17 
COR 0.367* 0.390 0.291** 0.188 
FIN 0.173** 0.062 0.091** 0.032 
INS 0.052** 0.805 0.214** 0.257 
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Panel C: Mean values of group and non-group firms based on industry categorization. 
 
Chemical Construction & 
Machinery 
Food & Textiles ICT & Domestic 
appliances 
Metal & 
Resources 
Trade & Services Transport Miscellaneous  
Group Non-
Group. 
Group Non-
Group. 
Group Non-
Group. 
Group Non-
Group. 
Group Non-
Group. 
Group Non-
Group. 
Group Non-
Group. 
Group Non-
Group. 
I/K 0.151 0.191 0.197 0.159 0.123 0.168 0.269 0.276 0.145 0.162 0.201 0.123 0.247 0.205 0.200 0.145 
CF/K 0.421 0.301 0.480 0.405 0.243 0.298 0.501 0.554 0.195 0.565 0.336 1.289 0.382 0.340 0.345 0.291 
Q 0.912 0.887 0.983 0.690 0.757 0.815 1.524 0.898 0.865 0.702 1.366 1.260 1.310 0.937 1.140 0.815 
TA 386 62 265 106 373 79 406 51 1700 114 1830 211 803 59 1405 443 
TS/K 2.846 3.185 3.392 2.888 1.69 2.54 4.178 4.861 1.563 4.618 1.062 4.941 3.585 2.381 2.871 3.245 
D/K 0.986 0.789 1.185 1.306 0.848 0.824 1.389 1.228 0.928 1.321 0.474 1.770 0.810 1.022 0.882 0.966 
AGE 27 19 33 29 30 22 26 26 30 18 48 13 34 16 35 29 
COR 0.323 0.231 0.414 0.285 0.340 0.206 0.420 0.222 0.434 0.242 0.413 0.077 0.409 0.224 0.373 0.300 
FIN 0.101 0.060 0.112 0.088 0.105 0.064 0.101 0.066 0.154 0.057 0.202 0.155 0.129 0.033 0.113 0.044 
INS 0.100 0.252 0.040 0.220 0.092 0.249 0.041 0.200 0.042 0.253 0.020 0.291 0.033 0.279 0.091 0.179 
Firm year 
obs. 
180 112 140 56 124 104 100 52 84 112 32 12 80 36 108 80 
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Table 2. Regression results for the Q model 
 
Panel A. OLS estimation 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is the ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The dependent variable is the investment-to-capital ratio. Q is the ratio of the market value of 
total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. Group Dummy is 
an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a business group, and zero otherwise. Size 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. The 
total number of firm-year observations is 1356. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is 
indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
 Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3) Model (4) 
 
Intercept 0.093** (3.814) 
0.105** 
(4.379) 
0.141** 
(4.296) 
0.145** 
(4.280) 
Q
 0.023** 
(2.649) 
0.022** 
(2.418) 
0.019** 
(2.284) 
0.018** 
(2.134) 
Cash flow 0.143** (7.106) 
0.113** 
(3.840) 
0.138** 
(7.034) 
0.115** 
(3.970) 
Cash flow * 
Group Dummy 
 0.064 
(1.636) 
 0.050 
(1.258) 
Group Dummy  -0.036* (-1.897) 
 -0.038** 
(-2.015) 
Size 0.013** (3.634) 
0.016** 
(3.886) 
0.012** 
(3.637) 
0.016** 
(3.948) 
Age -0.016** (1.966) 
-0.019** 
(2.510) 
-0.012 
(1.447) 
-0.014* 
(1.793) 
Time and Industry 
dummies 
No No Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 
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Panel B. 2SLS estimation 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is two-stage least squares 
estimation (2SLS). The dependent variable is the investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The variable Q 
is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-
to-capital ratio. Group Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a 
business group, and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural 
logarithm of years since incorporation. All regressions use previous year’s variables as instruments. 
The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. 
The total number of firm-year observations is 1356. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is 
indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
 Model (5) Model (6)  Model (7) Model (8) 
 
Intercept 0.062** 
(2.370) 
0.083** 
(3.036) 
0.119** 
(3.672) 
0.132** 
(3.823) 
Q
 
0.043** 
(2.832) 
0.034** 
(2.399) 
0.030** 
(2.305) 
0.028* 
(1.938) 
Cash flow 0.166** 
(6.600) 
0.118** 
(4.002) 
0.157** 
(6.493) 
0.117** 
(4.194) 
Cash flow *  
Group Dummy 
 0.103** 
(2.126) 
 0.085* 
(1.805) 
Group Dummy 
 
 -0.055** 
(2.842) 
 -0.053** 
(-2.790) 
Size 0.011** 
(3.153) 
0.010** 
(3.986) 
0.011** 
(3.356) 
0.017** 
(4.062) 
Age -0.012 
(1.553) 
-0.016** 
(2.208) 
-0.009 
(1.123) 
-0.013 
(1.626) 
Time and Industry 
dummies 
No No Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.16 
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Table 3. Year-by-year regression results for the Q model  
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation methods are the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the two-stage least squares (2SLS) techniques. The 
dependent variable is the investment-to-capital ratio. Q is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital 
ratio. Group Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a business group, and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. The 
number of observations for each of the fiscal years ending 1997-2000 is 339. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated in bold face and by * and 
**, respectively. 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS  
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Model 
(7) 
Model 
(8) 
Model 
(9) 
Model 
(10) 
Model 
(11) 
Model 
(12) 
Model 
(13) 
Model 
(14) 
Model 
(15) 
Model 
(16) 
Intercept 0.019 0.016 -0.024 -0.025 0.102* 0.091 0.096 0.078 0.077 0.090 0.075* 0.08* 0.140* 0.156** 0.124* 0.175** 
Q 0.080** 0.083** 0.107** 0.111** 0.047** 0.050** 0.037 0.048* 0.018** 0.017** 0.024** 0.02** 0.002** -0.003 -0.008 -0.017 
Cash flow 0.129** 0.110** 0.172** 0.144** 0.113** 0.094** 0.134** 0.123** 0.093** 0.055** 0.082** 0.051 0.189** 0.164** 0.219** 0.155** 
Cash flow * 
Group dummy 
 0.032  0.050  0.036  0.019  0.072*  0.066  0.068  0.150 
Group dummy  -0.038  -0.054  -0.076**  -0.067*  -0.035  -0.033  -0.024  -0.057 
Size 0.022** 0.027** 0.022** 0.029** 0.018** 0.028** 0.019** 0.028** 0.015** 0.019** 0.015** 0.019** -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001 
Age -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.027* -0.026* -0.026* -0.025 -0.022* -0.026* -0.022* -0.026* -0.004 -0.008 -0.001 -0.014 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 
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Table 4. Regression results for the Euler equation 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is the two-stage least squares 
estimation . The dependent variable is the investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The variable sales (-1) 
is the one-period lagged sales-to-capital ratio. Cash flow (-1) is the one period lagged cash flow-to-
capital ratio. Group Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a business 
group, and zero otherwise. Investment (-1) is one-period lagged investment-to-capital ratio. Investment 
(-1) sq is the squared value one-period lagged investment. Leverage (-1) sq is the squared value of total 
debt divided by total assets lagged by one-period. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is 
the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The estimation uses previous year’s values as 
instruments. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in 
parentheses. The total number of firm-year observations is 1356. Statistical significance at the 10% and 
5% levels is indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Intercept 0.116** (1.970) 
0.133** 
(2.590) 
   0.136** 
  (3.163) 
0.103** 
(2.884) 
0.132** 
   (3.571) 
   0.171** 
  (4.200) 
Sales (-1)
 
-0.002 
(0.376) 
-0.003 
(0.583) 
-0.005 
(0.124) 
-0.007* 
(1.716) 
-0.003 
(0.768) 
-0.001 
(0.141) 
Cash flow (-1) 0.180** (3.951) 
0.135** 
(2.593) 
0.099** 
(3.024) 
0.121** 
(2.401) 
0.136** 
(3.319) 
0.099** 
(2.842) 
Cash flow (-1) * 
Group Dummy 
 0.089 
(1.330) 
0.098** 
(1.914) 
0.078 
(1.264) 
0.092* 
(1.744) 
0.117** 
(2.239) 
Group Dummy  -0.048* (1.660) 
-0.039* 
(1.884) 
-0.038* 
(1.784) 
-0.037* 
(1.751) 
-0.065** 
(2.834) 
Investment (-1) 0.618 (0.981) 
0.586 
(0.990) 
    0.618 
(1.301) 
0.157* 
(1.699) 
 
Investment (-1) sq. -0.480 (0.681) 
-0.449 
(0.674) 
 -0.450 
(0.801) 
  
Leverage (-1) sq. -0.009 (0.897) 
-0.007 
(1.177) 
  -0.009* 
(-1.791) 
 
Size 0.006 (0.755) 
0.010 
(1.179) 
   0.020** 
(4.407) 
Age -0.020 (1.410) 
-0.023* 
(1.775) 
   -0.024** 
(2.268) 
Time & Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.15 
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Table 5. Regression results using annual averages 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation methods are ordinary least squares 
(Models 1 & 2); two-stage least squares (Models 3 & 4); and the Euler specification (Models 5 & 6) 
techniques. The dependent variable is the investment-to-capital ratio. Q is the ratio of the market 
value of total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. Group 
Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a business group, and zero 
otherwise. The variable sales (-1) is the one-period lagged sales-to-capital ratio. Cash flow (-1) is the 
one period lagged cash flow-to-capital ratio. Investment (-1) is one-period lagged investment-to-
capital ratio. Investment (-1) sq is the squared value one-period lagged investment. Leverage (-1) sq 
is the squared value of total debt divided by total assets lagged by one-period. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. Previous year’s 
values of the variables are used as instruments. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected 
absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is 
indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Intercept 0.092**     (2.470) 
0.102** 
(2.570) 
   0.079** 
  (2.187) 
0.094** 
(2.354) 
0.034 
    (0.964) 
0.054 
    (1.550) 
Q 0.035**      (2.721) 
0.034** 
     (2.721) 
  0.044** 
  (2.930) 
0.042** 
(2.725) 
  
Cash flow  0.112** (4.133) 
0.077** 
(2.723) 
  0.121** 
  (4.137) 
0.076** 
(2.705) 
  
Cash flow*Group 
Dummy  
 0.074* 
(1.724) 
  0.095** 
(2.119) 
  
Group Dummy  -0.050** (-2.146) 
 -0.059** 
(2.584) 
  
Sales (-1)
 
    -0.004 
(1.598) 
-0.004* 
(1.795) 
Cash flow (-1)     0.091** (3.174) 
0.047** 
(2.245) 
Cash flow (-1) * 
Group Dummy 
     0.099** 
(3.256) 
Group Dummy      -0.037** (2.329) 
Investment (-1) 
       0.924** 
(9.594) 
0.914** 
(9.759) 
Investment (-1) sq.     -0.038** (4.120) 
-0.367** 
(4.164) 
Leverage (-1) sq.     -0.003 (0.930) 
-0.003 
(1.124) 
Size 0.010** (2.313) 
0.015** 
(2.829) 
0.009** 
(2.092) 
0.015** 
(2.764) 
-0.005** 
(1.634) 
 0.002** 
(0.678) 
Age 
-0.011 
(1.194) 
-0.014 
(1.512) 
-0.010 
(1.026) 
-0.014 
(1.415) 
-0.007 
(0.749) 
-0.013 
(1.406) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.69 0.71 
No of obs. 339 339 339 339 339 339 
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Table 6. Regression results examining overinvestment 
 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and the two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS). The dependent variable is the investment-to-
capital ratio. The variable Q is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. High Q is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the 
group or non-group firm’s Q is greater than or equal to the corresponding medians, and zero otherwise. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. 
The 2SLS estimations use previous year’s variables as instruments. The heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 
10% and 5% levels is indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
 
OLS  2SLS  
Group Non-group Group  Non-group 
Intercept 0.182** (3.379) 
0.064 
(1.210) 
0.159** 
(3.030) 
0.040 
(0.742) 
Q 0.004 (0.584) 
0.055 
(1.533) 
-0.003 
(0.176) 
0.105** 
(1.961) 
Cash flow  0.156** (4.681) 
0.110** 
(2.835) 
0.181** 
(4.166) 
0.152** 
(2.368) 
Cash flow * High Q 0.039 (0.396) 
-0.003 
(0.064) 
0.099** 
(2.022) 
-0.051 
(0.731) 
Size 0.010** (1.994)  
0.028** 
(2.887) 
0.011** 
(2.467) 
0.021** 
(2.101) 
Age -0.013 (1.427) 
-0.026* 
(1.749) 
-0.016 
(1.529) 
-0.022 
(1.547) 
Time and Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.14 
No. of observations 792 564 792 564 
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Table 7. Regression results for the size sub-samples 
 
The table presents the ordinary least squares regression results. The dependent variable is the 
investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The size sub-samples are formed by using the median values 
of group and non-group firms. Large firms are those with total assets greater than or equal to 
sample median whereas small firms are those with total assets lower than sample median. Group 
Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a firm belongs to a business group, and zero 
otherwise. Size Dummy is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the size of group or non-
group firm is larger than or equal to respective median values, and zero otherwise. The variable Q 
is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash 
flow-to-capital ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of 
years since incorporation. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values 
are mentioned in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is indicated in bold 
face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
 Large  Small  Group  Non-group  
 
Intercept 0.308** 
(4.452) 
0.061 
(1.095) 
0.240** 
(4.197) 
-0.005 
(0.081) 
Q 0.016* (1.777) 
0.026* 
(1.402) 
0.005 
(0.552) 
0.040 
(1.566) 
Cash flow 0.059** 
(2.798) 
0.137** 
(3.427) 
0.155** 
(5.213) 
0.227** 
(5.193) 
Cash flow * 
Group Dummy 
0.097** 
(2.378) 
0.035 
(0.650) 
  
Group Dummy 
 
-0.079** 
(2.750) 
-0.033 
(1.453) 
  
Cash flow * Size 
Dummy 
  0.098** 
(1.735) 
-0.177** 
(3.750) 
Size Dummy 
 
  0.010 
(0.457) 
0.062** 
(2.111) 
Size -0.005 
(0.871)  
0.027** 
(2.674) 
-0.001 
(0.048) 
0.030** 
(2.457) 
Age -0.019 
(1.456) 
-0.015 
(1.371) 
-0.017* 
(1.814) 
-0.016 
(1.147) 
Time and Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.19 
No. of 
observations 
678 678 792 564 
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Table 8. Regression results for the age and the leverage sub-samples 
 
The table presents the ordinary least squares regression results. The dependent variable is the 
investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The age and leverage sub-samples are formed by segregating 
these into group and non-group firms. The variable Q is the ratio of the market value of total assets 
to book value of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. Age Dummy and Leverage 
Dummy are indicator variables that are equal to one if the corresponding values are greater than or 
equal to the group and non-group medians, and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Age is the natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-corrected absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 10% and 5% levels is indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
Age Leverage  
Group Non-group Group Non-group 
Intercept 0.186** 
(3.251) 
0.079 
(1.340) 
0.172** 
(3.218) 
0.060 
(1.105) 
Q
 
0.010 
(1.289) 
0.055 
(1.527) 
0.015** 
(2.134) 
0.048 
(1.260) 
Cash flow 0.143** 
(4.940) 
0.092** 
(3.058) 
0.154** 
(5.361) 
0.148** 
(4.063) 
Cash flow *  
Age Dummy 
0.058 
(1.024) 
0.076 
(1.540) 
  
Age Dummy 
 
-0.024 
(0.970) 
-0.016 
(0.468) 
  
Cash flow *  
Leverage Dummy 
  0.101 
(0.196) 
-0.054 
(0.985) 
Leverage Dummy   0.082** (4.122) 
0.064** 
(2.416) 
Size 0.010** (2.061) 
0.029** 
(2.966) 
0.006 
(1.317) 
0.027** 
(2.660) 
Age -0.011 (0.751) 
-0.032 
(1.468) 
-0.017* 
(1.803) 
-0.031** 
(2.039) 
Time and Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.15 0.23 0.16 
No. of observations 792 564 792 564 
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Table 9. Regression results for the ownership sub-samples 
 
The table presents the ordinary least squares regression results. The dependent variable is the 
investment-to-capital ratio of a firm. The ownership sub-samples are formed by segregating these into 
group and non-group firms. The variable Q is the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value 
of total assets. Cash flow is the cash flow-to-capital ratio. Ownership Dummy is an indicator variable 
that is equal to one if the corresponding ownership values are greater than or equal to the group or non-
group sample median, and zero otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Age is the 
natural logarithm of years since incorporation. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected 
absolute t-values are mentioned in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels is 
indicated in bold face and by * and **, respectively. 
 
 
Corporate Ownership Institutional Ownership Insider Ownership  
Group Non-group Group  Non-group Group  Non-group 
Intercept 0.171** 
(3.286) 
0.067 
(1.297) 
0.190** 
(3.094) 
0.042 
(0.813) 
0.151** 
(2.715) 
0.057 
(1.070) 
Q
 
0.009 
(1.251) 
0.044 
(1.443) 
0.009 
(1.236) 
0.052 
(1.561) 
0.008 
(1.216) 
0.053 
(1.540) 
Cash flow 0.173** 
(4.315) 
0.070** 
(3.242) 
0.166** 
(5.215) 
0.145** 
(3.737) 
0.200** 
(5.032) 
0.114** 
(2.854) 
Cash flow * 
Ownership Dummy 
-0.013 
(0.216) 
0.112** 
(2.374) 
0.007 
(0.098) 
-0.071 
(1.478) 
-0.046 
(0.797) 
-0.016 
(0.342) 
Ownership Dummy 
 
0.019 
(0.984) 
-0.023 
(1.090) 
0.003 
(0.142) 
0.008 
(0.290) 
0.041** 
(1.984) 
0.015 
(0.711) 
Size 0.010** 
(2.130) 
0.027** 
(2.855) 
0.008* 
(1.483) 
0.031** 
(2.822) 
0.011** 
(2.203)  
0.029** 
(3.021)  
Age -0.013 
(1.385) 
-0.021 
(1.514) 
-0.014 
(1.367) 
-0.023* 
(1.677) 
-0.013 
(1.388) 
-0.026* 
(1.767) 
Time and Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.15 
No. of observations 792 564 792 564 792 564 
 
